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A. L. STINCHCOMBE. -Theoretical Methods in Social History. New York : 
Academic Press, 1978. Pp. x, 130. 
The title of this book, as its author himself concedes, is bound to raise false 
expectations. Its subject is not the application of social theory to social history; 
it is the proper use of history in the construction of social theory: "how generality 
can be wrested from historical facts" (115). A recurring theme is that the theorizing 
of the social sciences has been seriously deformed and rendered unfruitful both 
by positivist notions of general hypotheses as the deliverances of a mysterious 
"synthetic reason", whose only encounter with the details of social reality is 
through the search for possible counter-instances, and by old-fashioned views of 
history which find the intelligibility of a narrative in the largescale "epochal" or-
ganization it succeeds in imposing on its subject-matter. Misgivings are also ex-
pressed about the tendency of quantification to degenerate into a "numerology" in 
which anything countable, and nothing else, is regarded as a fact; but these ap-
pear to be peripheral to the main argument. The alleged positivist error - which 
might perhaps have been more pointedly discussed with reference to what is 
presumably its latest incarnation: the logik der forschung of K. R. Popper - is 
traced, at rather long range, to Kant. The mistaken view of historical narrative is 
traced, at equally long range, to Nietzsche. The cure in both cases is said to be the 
realization that it is from a study of particular historical interpretations, and from 
the details of the latter, that the general concepts and hypotheses of the social 
sciences must come if they are to be empirically powerful. They must be ex-
trapolations of "deep analogies" discerned between causal processes which have 
been independently investigated. 
According to Stinchcombe, the best social theorists have always under-
stood this - a contention for which he presents evidence in the form of a com-
parative analysis of Leon Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution, Alexis de 
Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Neil Smelser's Social 
Change in the Industrial Revolution , and Reinhard Bendix's Work and Authority 
in Industry. His comparison of Trotsky and de Tocqueville is the most carefully 
worked through, and is of interest quite apart from the theory of social inquiry 
which it is intended to reinforce. What Stinchcombe argues is that, despite their 
different "epochal" views of history, and despite the vast difference between their 
Marxist and conservative theoretical orientations, their encounter with the facts of 
the revolutionary processes they studied so perceptively drives them into theorizing 
about authority and its demise in ways which are remarkably alike . Both draw 
heavily upon such commonsense notions as that authority tends to be accepted only 
so long as it is believed either to promote accepted social purposes effectively or 
to be irresistible (hence the significance de Tocqueville rightly attributes to the 
defection of a minority of the French aristocracy), and that, in general, men's 
situations will not motivate then to act in abstraction from their changing per-
ceptions of the possibilities open to them (which allows Trotsky to follow without 
surprise the rapid shifts of policy of the Petersburg garrison or Kerensky). 
In all this there is more than a hint of two doctrines which, while charac-
teristic enough of much traditional historiography, have been matters of great 
controversy among methodologists of the social sciences: that the ultimate under-
standing of social processes must be found in what makes individual human beings 
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decide to act as they do (methodological individualism), and that what normally 
makes them act as they do is their view of the means they need to adopt to achieve 
their ends (rationalism). Thus Trotsky is praised for showing us "sensible men 
calculating whether they can get what they want out of the Social Revolutionaries 
or out of the Bolsheviks" (121). Unfortunately, since Stinchcombe neither con-
siders, nor even shows much awareness of the well-known difficulties of both 
doctrines, his claims in this connection cannot but appear rather dogmatic. Disap-
pointing also is his failure to offer any analysis of the notions of causal process 
and causal explanation which are so central to his concerns. He does tell us that 
causation "does not operate at the grand level of 'Why did the Russian Revolution 
lead to Stalinism?', but on the segmented level of 'How do revolutionary legis-
latures legitimate coups d'etat?" ' (17). In fact, it often seems to be his contention 
that it "operates" only at the level of 'How did this legislature legitimate this 
coup d'etat?" What we need, then, is a clear account of how such particular causal 
claims are vindicated, and how, in this connection, the "post hoc" fallacy is avoid-
ed. Stinchcombe implies, at one point, that they are established by means of 
theory - by reducing opaque connections to "theoretically understandable bits" 
(14): however, this can hardly be the theory that is to emerge from perceiving 
"deep analogies" between the particular causal connections themse1ves. Else-
where he appears content to represent social theory as dependent, in the end, on 
"pretty good guesses" about what caused what in particular cases (122) . It may be 
that such a procedure is in fact defensible: historians have long been accused of 
indulging in it. But it is strange to find it stated with so little supporting argument 
in a work on social science methodology. 
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CHARLES TILLY, ed. -Historical Studies of Changing Fertility. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978. Pp. ix, 390. 
Unlike most of the drivel which is published as the "proceedings" of 
academic conferences, unconnected snippets of interest to no one save the authors 
and their tenure review committees, the conference on changes in fertility which 
the National Science Foundation sponsored in Princeton in 1972 has resulted in a 
volume that everyone interested in this sort of thing will probably wish to acquire. 
Whether the papers would have been published anyway, and been just as good 
even had no conference taken place, is beside the point : they are important 
guides to an increasingly tangled literature and conveniently assembled in paper-
back for anyone who wants to catch up on the latest in historical demography. 
Charles Tilly's introduction summarizes the main debates touching the 
fertility decline: why does illegitimate fertility drop at the same time as legitimate? 
Why do all these interesting demographic phenomena seem to erupt just as a mas-
sive pauperization of Europe's population (which he calls "proletarianization") 
begins, and so forth? The piece is lucid and literate, and deserves to be made ac-
cessible to undergraduates in pamphlet form. The other contributions are more for 
specialists. 
Richard Easterlin's paper, for example, requires some understanding of 
mathematical economics to be comprehensible in its entirety, but even for those 
who don't want to pause too long over the equations and "demand model" graphs, 
